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Keywords
Introduction
There is a stalemate in macroeconomics today. After enjoying its heyday, 
the ‘New Consensus’ standard paradigm is in crisis on account of  its dra-
matic failure to predict the recent financial crisis and the Great Recession. 
Many leading economists – well beyond the confines of  post-Keynesian 
approaches stressing that the GR somehow implies the ‘return of  the Mas-
ter’ (see e.g. Skidelski 2009) – and, rather surprisingly, even quite orthodox 
central bankers such as Greenspan and Trichet, quite simply recognize that 
‘macroeconomics has taken the wrong path’ (Farmer 2014).
For this reason, a number of  authors propose new paradigms, several 
of  which with a Keynesian orientation (see e.g. Akerlof  and Shiller 2009, 
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This paper emphasizes two major reasons why in the present context a para-
digm shift in macroeconomics is unlikely to materialize, in contrast with what hap-
pened in the 1930s. First of  all, the standard paradigm – despite its predictive and 
explanatory failures – appears to be an internally consistent research programme, 
built around a unifying framework like the Arrow-Debreu model. Secondly, various 
types of  ‘Keynesian’ critics of  the standard paradigm, while raising relevant issues, 
such as the role of  animal spirits in the analysis, seem to miss the target of  building 
a new paradigm precisely because they fail to rely upon a truly alternative unifying 
framework.
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Farmer 2014, Mankiw 2013, Stiglitz 2010). However, despite a great deal of  
‘label-mania’ within Keynesian economics – a good example is the recent 
neo-paleo-Keynesian (NPK) research programme proposed by Farmer – a 
paradigm shift is not yet visible and it is doubtful that it will ever material-
ize, in contrast with what happened in the 1930s. The aim of  the paper is 
to clarify the reasons why this shift is actually very difficult to carry out in 
the present context. Its thesis is that the shift is not taking place mainly be-
cause of  critics’ inability to break effectively with the standard neo-classical 
paradigm; more specifically, ‘label-mania’ within Keynesian theory may be 
a healthy sign of  a lively debate but it is also a sign of  downright confusion. 
To demonstrate this point, I focus on one of  the most significant cri-
tiques of  current DSGE models which have appeared in the literature, 
namely that they omit the crucial Keynesian explanatory variable of  ani-
mal spirits (see e.g. Akerlof  and Shiller 2009, Farmer 2014, Frydman and 
Golberg 2011, Greenspan 2008). Greenspan, for example, recognizes that 
the GR has once again shown us ‘the innate human responses that result in 
swings between euphoria and fear that repeat themselves generation after 
generation with little evidence of  a learning curve’ (Greenspan 2008: 9; my 
italics). In his view, such swings represent ‘the large missing “explanatory 
variable” in both risk-management and macroeconometric models’ (ibid.).
Some proposals for alternative paradigms start merely by seeking to 
remedy this omission. In particular, this paper focuses on the following: a) 
the ‘neo-paleo-Keynesian’ research programme proposed by Farmer 2014 
that seeks to introduce animal spirits to the general equilibrium model 
(section 2); b) Akerlof  and Shiller’s behavioural approach that has recently 
drawn the attention of  economists to this variable (section 3); c) Sheila 
Dow’s analysis stressing the role of  animal spirits within the post-Keynes-
ian approach (section 4).
1. Animal Spirits and General Equilibrium Theory
Several economists stress the limitations of  the dominant new-Keynes-
ian stance by placing the emphasis on money wage rigidity in DSGE mod-
els and reaching the conclusion, among others, that monetary policy is not 
neutral in the short-run. In particular, Farmer raises a crucial critique con-
cerning the identity of  the new-Keynesian approach: ‘Despite its name, the 
new-Keynesian research program is neither new nor Keynesian. The idea, 
that real economic activity may be different from its long-run steady state 
as a consequence of  sticky prices, is firmly rooted in monetarist tradition’ 
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To remedy this omission, Farmer proposes a new research programme, 
which he labels ‘neo-paleo-Keynesian’ (NPK). However, it can be argued 
that this label is a sign of  confusion. For example, he claims that his re-
search program:
Is unashamedly neo-classical. It seeks to reconcile Keynesian ideas with the 
microeconomics of  general equilibrium theory; and it does so in a new way. As 
with new-classical and new-Keynesian economics, neo-paleo-Keynesianism con-
structs models of  rational actors who interact in markets. In contrast to new clas-
sical and new-Keynesian programs, neo-paleo-Keynesianism contains two propo-
sitions that are absent from the hard core of  these agendas: 1) there is a continuum 
of  possible equilibrium unemployment rates and 2) the unemployment rate that 
prevails is determined by the “animal spirits” of  investors’ (ibid.).
How can a ‘neo-classical’ research programme be a more Keynesian 
alternative than the new-Keynesian one? My impression is that the pro-
gramme Farmer proposes is not really an alternative to the standard ap-
proach and that it may at best represent a particular way of  developing it.
To make this point clear, I begin by focusing on Lakatos’s ‘research pro-
gramme’ notion, to which Farmer makes implicit reference in the above 
quotation. As Hands notes, this notion is quite useful especially ‘for under-
standing the structure of  economics (or a particular economic theory), even 
if  it is not a good tool for assessment. Economic theories do seem to have 
hardcores, protective belts, positive and negative heuristics’ (Hands 2001: 
296).1
More specifically, according to Lakatos, it is possible to distinguish the 
following parts of  a general research programme: a) the hardcore, which 
is made up of  the metaphysical or unquestioned principles or postulates 
of  its vision (in this case, of  the economy); the protective belt (auxiliary 
or simplifying assumptions which are needed to build up specific models 
or theories), and positive heuristics (i.e. beliefs on how to develop the pro-
gramme) and negative heuristics (the moves that the programme forbids).
It can be argued that the strength of  the standard macro paradigm lies 
in its internal consistency. In particular, I suggest that the current ortho-
doxy is consistent not just because it is cast in an axiomatic form but also 
because it provides a correct articulation of  its research programme along 
Lakatosian lines. For example, within the neo-Walrasian framework under-
lying standard macro, the postulates/simplifying assumptions distinction is 
1 For a significant instance of  Lakatosian analysis of  economic paradigms, see e.g. Lejon-
hufvud 1976. For the distinction between prescriptive and descriptive use of  Lakatos’s frame-
work, see also Dow 2012: 111.
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clearly made. This is because such a framework is based on the Arrow-
Debreu model, which fixes the ‘grammar’ for correct economic theorizing 
and formalizes the vision of  the economy on the grounds of  basic postu-
lates, such as the rational atomistic agent, the equilibrium method and the 
view that phenomena should be explained in individualist terms (see e.g. 
Hahn 1984). Such postulates single out the ‘drivers’, the so-called ‘deep pa-
rameters’: i.e. individual preferences and resources, such as technology and 
the amount of  labour and capital, which are assumed to be stable.
In the current orthodoxy, the general Arrow Debreu framework is one 
thing and a specific construct, such as the Real Business Cycle model, is 
another. While the former is a meta-model, the latter is just one instance 
of  general equilibrium theory that is subject to great simplifications – such 
as perfectly competitive markets, full price flexibility, representative agents 
and rational expectations – in order to carry out macroeconomic analysis. 
In particular, it should be noted that these simplifying devices:
a)  are needed to build up macro as technical discipline providing a ‘posi-
tive’ simple, unifying representation of  the economy as a whole; 
b)  are strictly interconnected and follow from the vision of  capitalism 
as being internally stable.
On these grounds, the following critical remarks on Farmer’s stance 
seem to be justified. First, contrary to what he believes, there can be no 
room for animal spirits (seen as purely irrational forces such as those men-
tioned by Greenspan in the above quotation) at the level of  hardcore, i.e. the 
basic postulates of  the general equilibrium approach. Introducing animal 
spirits at this level would contradict the first principle of  rationality and the 
key role of  ‘deep parameters’, which are assumed to be stable. In particular, 
it can be argued that, f rom the standpoint of  pure theory, animal spirits and 
deep parameters are not in pari materia: the former (together with other 
forms of  behaviour such as rules of  thumb) represent ‘phenomenological’ 
data, while the latter represent, as the term ‘deep’ suggests, an ‘essential’ 
level of  reality, beneath the surface of  phenomenological appearances.2
Secondly, animal spirits cannot find room at the level of  simplifying 
assumptions either. The point is that these are needed to highlight the nor-
mal working (in the positive, descriptive sense) of  the economy (including 
business cycles) 3 on the grounds of  the ‘deep parameters’, the only struc-
2 For an interpretation of  standard macro (in particular, Lucas’s approach) as a form of  
‘essentialism’, see e.g. Togati 1998: 218-225.
3 Thanks to stochastic formulation of  equilibrium, the notion of  ‘normal’ working of  the 
economy is not confined to ‘long-run equilibrium’, it has been extended to include fluctuations 
in the shape of  comovements. This means that according to the standard postulates the econ-
omy can be regarded as being always in equilibrium.
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tural data we need to understand this working along neo-classical lines. 
Introducing animal spirits at this level would impair the main aim of  such 
simplifications, which is to provide simple, ‘coherent’ representations of  
the economy as a whole. Indeed, the evolution of  standard macro from 
the early days of  the neoclassical synthesis to DSGE models has consisted 
of  purging models gradually from the factors that are not a direct expres-
sion of  ‘deep parameters’, such as aggregate demand. In their neoclassi-
cal variants, DSGE models do not even allow it to enter the picture as a 
disturbing shock; indeed, the only shocks that are, in principle, allowed in 
these models are those relating to deep parameters such as technology and 
preferences.
Thirdly, the consideration of  animal spirits is possible instead at the 
level of  positive heuristics of  the general equilibrium research programme. 
This means that it represents a development of  the programme rather than 
a full-blown alternative to it. To see this point, it is important to realize that 
the explanatory power of  the Arrow-Debreu model is not confined to the 
positive side of  the analysis, namely the description of  an ideal economy 
where there are complete markets. It also has a normative side, helping, 
for example, to structure the analysis of  real-world economies when some 
features of  the Arrow-Debreu model, such as the complete set of  future 
markets, are missing. This kind of  ‘negative’ method has been adopted by 
Hahn, for example, in several contributions (see e.g. Hahn 1984).
In principle, there could be many possible deviations in the real world 
economy from the norm set by the perfect and complete Arrow-Debreu 
market world; one might think, for example, of  phenomena such as unem-
ployment, crises, bubbles etc., which would be impossible in such an ideal 
setting. These deviations can be interpreted as departures from the above 
postulates or auxiliary assumptions. Such departures can be as many as 
there are potential market (or government) imperfections and each could 
generate a positive heuristic development.
For example, as Farmer himself  stresses, persistent unemployment in 
the neo-Walrasian macro models must be traced to price rigidities, one of  
the main ‘empirical obstacles’ to the realization of  full equilibrium in vari-
ous markets.4 But these in turn can be accounted for in seemingly alterna-
tive ways by making reference to various types of  market imperfections. 
One of  these is a form of  irrationality, namely workers’ money illusion, 
long emphasized in the literature (e.g. Leontief  1936). In his programme, 
Farmer does not specify what he means by ‘animal spirits’. However, if  
4 This is so because price rigidities do not undermine the possibility of  providing simple 
representations of  the economy on the grounds of  ‘deep’ parameters.
TEODORO DARIO TOGATI98
these are defined to include money illusion as well,5 it can be argued that 
not only is his proposal not alternative to the standard one, but not par-
ticularly new either. On the other hand, if  by using the term he refers to 
the spontaneous mood of  investors à la Keynes, then his aim to link ani-
mal spirits to multiple equilibria does not appear consistent with the logic 
of  general equilibrium for at least two reasons. First, following this logic, 
investments are primarily determined by technology influencing the mar-
ginal productivity of  capital; thus animal spirits remain an ad hoc factor. 
Secondly, even if  there were unexplained shifts in investment, the capital 
market by itself  is irrelevant in accounting for multiple equilibria since de-
termines not the level of  income but only the real rate of  interest. In other 
words, the problem Farmer addresses is that in general equilibrium analysis 
there is no room not only for animal spirits as such but, more in general, for 
the principle of  effective demand.
2. Animal Spirits and the Behavioural Approach
Following the behavioural approach, Akerlof  and Shiller (2009) make 
a very significant contribution to the analysis of  animal spirits, which they 
regard as the basis for an alternative macroeconomic paradigm. They too 
stress the limitations of  the DSGE models, especially as far as the interpre-
tation of  the recent GR is concerned:
Most economists [...] assume [...] that variations in individual feelings, impres-
sions and passions do not matter in the aggregate and that economic events are 
driven by inscrutable technical factors or erratic government action (Akerlof  and 
Shiller 2009: 1).
Unlike most economists (including Greenspan and Farmer), Akerlof  
and Shiller extend the notion of  animal spirits, well beyond familiar usage 
(for an assessment see Dow and Dow 2011). While traditionally this notion 
has been regarded as vague (e.g. Fuster et al. 2010: 67) or a kind of  black 
box, they try to look inside it. As the following citation shows, they regard 
it as encompassing several forms of  irrational behaviour:
The idea that economic crises, like the current financial and housing crisis, 
are mainly caused by changing thought patterns goes against standard economic 
thinking. But the current crisis bears witness to the role of  such changes in think-
ing. It was caused precisely by our changing confidence, temptations, envy, resentment 
5 This is what Akerlof and Shiller (2009) do, see below.
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and illusions –and especially by changing stories about the nature of  the economy 
(ibid.: 4, my italics).
On the basis of  this broad interpretation, they justify their critique of  
the dominant new-Keynesian stance that relies on DSGE models and ex-
plains persistent unemployment on grounds of  money wage rigidity. Strict-
ly speaking, in their view these economists do not neglect animal spirits 
tout court, but consider only one specific form that leads them to make only 
a minimal departure from full employment and standard models:
Macroeconomics textbooks [used to] explain deviation from full employment 
by a single type of  animal spirit: that workers dislike money wage cuts, and that 
employers are therefore reluctant to make them [...]. A more sophisticated expla-
nation for why wages are slow to change [...] explains fluctuations in employment 
arising from shifts in demand as due to [...] ‘staggered contracts’. The macro text-
books are full of  many other departures from the simple thought experiment of  
Adam Smith [...] and that leads us to the philosophical difference between this 
book and standard economics texts. This book is derived from a different view 
of  how economics should be described. The economics of  the textbooks seeks 
to minimize as much as possible departures from pure economic motivation 
and from rationality [...]. Explanations in terms of  small deviations from Adam 
Smith’s ideal system are clear [...] (and) well understood. But does not mean that 
these small deviations [...] describe how the economy really works (ibid.: 4-59).
Akerlof  and Shiller thus emphasize that their broad interpretation of  
animal spirits allows them to capture how the ‘economy really works’ and 
why it takes rollercoaster rides, making a much broader deviation from 
the Arrow-Debreu ideal system (seen as formalization of  the invisible hand 
view) than most economists are willing to do:
In our view economic theory should be derived not from the minimal devia-
tions from the system of  Adam Smith but rather from the deviations that actually 
do occur and that can be observed [...] a description of  how the economy really 
works must consider those animal spirits (ibid.: 5).
It is important to clarify the methodological implications of  Akerlof  
and Shiller’s broader analysis of  animal spirits. As the above citation shows, 
in their view these are not just a matter of  pure psychological or irrational 
moves, such as mental energy or life force, but also include social features, 
such as confidence, fairness, corruption, money illusion and stories, that 
play a key role in the economy. For example, they regard the New Econo-
my as a ‘story’, i.e. a false collective belief  or rationalisation of  a ‘new era’ 
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leading to bubbles or unjustified asset prices.6
The major methodological implication of  this approach is that it in-
volves a shift of  emphasis from pure deductivist forms of  analysis to ob-
servation of  agents’ actual behaviour. Indeed, unlike Farmer, Akerlof  and 
Shiller do not aim to construct better general equilibrium models by insert-
ing animal spirits into them, nor do they seek to build simple aggregate 
models that could represent an alternative to DSGE models. They seem to 
believe that with the provision of  a more complete account of  how agents’ 
actual behaviour deviates from the norm – which is the aim of  behavioural 
economics – the norm itself  becomes less and less relevant.
The important question to ask, however, is whether this step is suffi-
cient to justify a new paradigm, alternative to standard macro. In the light 
of  the previous account of  the structure of  paradigms along Lakatosian 
lines, the answer has to be negative. The point is that Akerlof  and Shiller 
do not provide an alternative neither at the level of  postulates nor at that 
of  auxiliary/simplifying assumptions. They simply regard agents’ actual 
behaviour as deviation from the perfect rationality benchmark, the first 
postulate of  the standard paradigm. This inevitably compels them to draw 
the conclusion that such behaviour is ‘irrational’. As already noted, empha-
sis on irrationality per se cannot aim to replace either the basic postulates 
of  standard theory or its account of  the ‘normal’ working of  the economy. 
Indeed, it can be argued that their work does not make a vast difference to 
conventional macroeconomic modelling. From this standpoint, it can be 
interpreted as a contribution along the lines of  early Keynesian models – 
incorporated in old textbooks, such as Dornbusch and Fisher (1990, ch. 12) 
and now outmoded since the advent of  rational expectations and DSGE on 
account of  their ‘ad hoc’ treatment of  expectations – that used to consider 
the role of  effective demand in terms of  shocks hitting the stable struc-
ture of  the economy (defined in the traditional sense as reflecting deep 
parameters).
In other words, through Akerlof  and Shiller’s lens Keynes appears sub-
stantially like Pigou, namely suggesting an approach to business cycles 
based on psychological factors, such as waves of  optimism and pessimism. 
They thus subscribe to a long-standing conclusion of  much of  Keynesian 
literature from Hicks’s ‘Mr Keynes and the Classics’ onwards: namely that 
at the end of  the day, Keynes’s theory is relevant essentially for dealing with 
pathological phenomena such as bubbles and fluctuations rather than the 
6 In particular, in his analysis of  the recent GR Shiller regards an epidemic of  irrational 
public enthusiasm for housing investment or ‘social contagion of  boom thinking as the most 
important single element to be reckoned with in this speculative boom’ (Shiller 2008: 41).
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normal or structural working of  the economy. DSGE models thus still have 
a role to play in representing the latter.
This is not all, however. It is even possible to suggest that Akerlof  and 
Shiller’s work actually represents a heuristic development of  the standard 
paradigm itself. This is so for at least two reasons. First, Akerlof  and Shiller 
could be regarded as completing the neoclassical research programme con-
cerning fluctuations, as indicated for example by Ohanian:
The literature on general equilibrium business cycle models has made consid-
erable progress in understanding how different model economies respond to what 
we call abstract shocks: shocks that do not have a precise definition or acknowl-
edged source. This category includes productivity shocks, preference shocks, fi-
nancial shocks, risk shocks and markup shocks, among others. However, because 
the focus of  the literature has been on studying the effect of  different types of  
shocks in different types of  economies, there has been less progress on developing 
and testing theories about the nature and sources of  these abstract shocks (Oha-
nian 2010: 48).
When seen in this perspective, the two authors do make a contribution 
to the definition of  the nature of  the shocks. While the standard paradigm 
relies on ‘abstract’ shifts in individual preferences, their work amounts to 
a clarification of  the fact that such shocks are ultimately due to a number 
of  natural or psychological features of  human behaviour that economists 
usually neglect. 
One may note, for example, that Akerlof  and Shiller’s contribution 
is useful in rationalizing a number of  ‘popular’ explanations’ of  the GR, 
tending to ‘personalize’ some of  its proximate causes – such as consum-
ers’ gullibility, mortgage brokers’ greed, flaws in the US regulatory system, 
securitization processes, investment bankers (who dreamed up the new se-
curity products), rating agencies – mentioned in Alan Blinder’s 2007 article 
entitled ‘Six fingers of  blame’.
Secondly, Akerlof  and Shiller’s analysis of  persistence of  fluctuations or 
recessions is not that different from the one provided by standard models: 
that is, they continue to regard money wage rigidity as the cause of  per-
sistent unemployment following shocks that shift the aggregate demand 
curve. Their broader view of  animal spirits leads them to place the empha-
sis on alternative explanations of  this rigidity (for example, those cast in 
terms of  fairness or efficiency wage) with respect to the standard money 
illusion account.
3. Animal Spirits and Post-Keynesian Analysis
TEODORO DARIO TOGATI102
The analysis of  animal spirits carried out by many post-Keynesians (e.g. 
Shackle 1967, Davidson 2009) quite naturally represents the starting point 
for their critique of  standard macro models. In line with their emphasis on 
true uncertainty, they regard animal spirits as referring to irrational, innate 
forces, which make investment appear as almost a totally autonomous, un-
caused cause of  economic events, such as fluctuations.
One problem with this stance is that it is not readily amenable to the 
construction of  an alternative paradigm, along the Lakatosian lines clari-
fied above. For this purpose, as noted above, placing the emphasis on irra-
tionality does not appear a viable solution. In particular, in order to make 
Keynesian theory capable of  dealing with the normal or structural work-
ing of  the economy rather than just with pathologies, it is also necessary 
to build a more positive analysis of  agents’ behaviour aimed at replacing 
the standard postulates. In this perspective, Sheila Dow’s work represents 
an important contribution. In contrast with the view just summarized, she 
emphasizes three main points:
A)  the need to overcome dualistic distinctions in the analysis of  agents’ 
behaviour, such as that between cognition and sentiment, in the 
light of  Keynes’s broader notion of  rationality (see e.g. Dow 2011);
B)  animal spirits are not entirely innate or spontaneous but also repre-
sent structural; 
C)  factors that can be ‘endogenized’ (see, e.g., Dow and Dow, 2011; 
Dow, 2013B);
D)  conventions play a key role in Keynes’s analysis and they partially 
overlap with animal spirits.
These features represent significant innovations with respect to the 
standard paradigm that could potentially open the way to an alternative, 
full-blown Keynesian macro paradigm. Suffice it to note that they imply 
calling into question the standard postulate of  rationality as well as meth-
odological individualism. However, this potential has yet to be fully real-
ized, mainly because Dow does not seem interested in pursuing the objec-
tive of  articulating the Keynesian paradigm along the lines advocated here. 
This may be so for various reasons. One may be that in post-Keynesian 
literature there is too much equivocation around terms, such as ‘postu-
lates’ or ‘fundamental assumptions’, which may sound like advocating an 
axiomatization or formalization of  Keynes’s theory, when in fact only a 
distinction between different parts of  a paradigm is what is needed. An-
other reason is that Dow regards the existence of  a plurality of  stances 
within the post-Keynesian camp as a positive feature, following the ‘horses 
for courses’ perspective (e.g. Dow 2013a). In this view, the construction of  
a unifying Keynesian paradigm playing the same role as the Arrow-Debreu 
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model in the standard approach simply fails to appear feasible and may 
even be misleading.
In my view, however, insofar as it represents a clear disadvantage with 
respect to standard macroeconomics and is therefore quite likely to ac-
count for its declining influence in both academic and policy terms, there 
is reason to believe that the lack of  such a unifying paradigm is the most 
important problem facing post-Keynesianism today. 
This view is forcefully stressed by a prominent Cambridge economist 
such as Pasinetti, who suggests that the problem arises with the General 
Theory itself  due to Keynes’s particular type of  ‘implicit theorizing’ 7 and 
is one that post-Keynesians have so far failed to remedy (for this reason he 
speaks of  ‘unfinished Keynesian revolution’ in the title of  his 2007 book): 
The model of  a pure exchange economy was in fact going through an analyti-
cal process that was making it into the most clearly formulated economic theory 
so far. The Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model, which has become the 
quintessence of  it, presents itself  as an extremely attractive, elegant formulation. 
Nothing similar has emerged for a monetary theory of  production. My feeling 
is that Keynes and his most direct pupils vastly underestimated the enormous 
amount of  work that such a project would have required. To work out the founda-
tions, and then to erect on them the edifice of  a ‘monetary theory of  production’ 
was a truly gigantic task that would have required the determined effort of  many 
researchers acting within a unifying theoretical framework [...]. Both Keynes and 
his immediate pupils at Cambridge […] proceeded more on the basis of  intuition 
than on the basis of  a clear vision of  the logical steps to take. The clarification of  
these concepts, and especially the search for a comprehensive theoretical frame-
work, has remained widely unaccomplished. Perhaps there was no time to do 
more (Pasinetti 1999: 11-12).
While sharing this assessment, I add two further points. The first con-
cerns my view of  Keynes’s ‘implicit theorizing’ and I wish to elaborate a 
little on what Pasinetti suggests here, namely that Keynes proceeded main-
ly ‘on the basis of  intuition than on clear vision of  the logical steps to take’. 
It can be argued that this means that Keynes failed to clarify a number of  
issues, such as those mentioned by Sheila Dow herself:
Keynes himself  made only limited explicit reference to epistemological and 
methodological issues in his economic writing. Indeed it has been the teasing out 
of  the epistemology and methodology implicit in Keynes’s economics that repre-
sented an exciting challenge for post-Keynesian methodologists. But Keynes could 
7 This expression can be used in various ways to express limitations of  the GT. It was 
originally coined by Leontief (193: 1947) to define the inconsistency between Keynes’s con-
clusions, such as the existence of  involuntary unemployment, with the standard postulates.
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perhaps have prevented some of  the confusion in interpreting the General Theory 
if  he had been more explicit in specifying why he constructed it the way he did. 
And indeed it was the (mis)interpretations on the part of  orthodox economists un 
the 1940s and 1950s that led to Keynes’s ideas being subsumed in the neoclassical 
synthesis (Dow 2013a: 80).
In the light of  this remark, I suggest that one of  the things that Keynes 
failed to do or left implicit – and which today accounts for the lack of  uni-
fying paradigm of  a monetary theory of  production – is that he did not 
elaborate his vision or meta-model of  the economy (reflected in funda-
mental assumptions) as a separate entity with respect to his model (inevita-
bly based on a number of  simplifying assumptions), in contrast with what 
happens in the current orthodoxy. My second point is that to remedy this 
flaw should be the main aim of  post-Keynesians’.8
Conclusion
By focusing on the role of  animal spirits in macro models, this paper 
leads to one major conclusion, namely that in the present context a para-
digm shift in macroeconomics is unlikely to materialize, in contrast with 
what happened in the 1930s. This is so for two major reasons. First of  all, 
the standard paradigm – despite its predictive and explanatory failures – ap-
pears to be a relatively solid construction, built as it is around a unifying 
framework like the Arrow-Debreu model. Secondly, a number of  critics 
of  the standard paradigm, while raising relevant issues, seem to miss the 
target of  building a new paradigm precisely because they fail to rely upon a 
truly alternative unifying framework.
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